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Abstract: Contextualism  in  epistemology  is  the  claim  that  the  knowledge  predicate  is 
contextsensitive in the sense that it has different truth conditions across different contexts of  
use. Jason Stanley objects against this view that if it were correct, then “know” should be 
gradable in the same way as gradable adjectives. Since it lacks gradability, it also lacks the 
postulated  contextsensitivity.  Or  so  Stanley  argues.  In  this  paper,  I  show  that  the 
contextualist is not committed to the gradability of the knowledge predicate in the first place.  
I  will  distinguish between what  I  will  call  pure threshold  predicates,  which either apply 
simpliciter or not at all in each context, and impure threshold predicates, for which context 
determines whether they apply simpliciter, but which can also be satisfied to certain degrees. 
Threshold predicates are not gradable, but many of exhibit just the kind of contextsensitivity  
that is postulated for “know”. Pace Stanley, three claims are going to be established: that the 
lack of gradability of the knowledge predicate (i) does not jeopardize its contextsensitivity, 
(ii) does not dismantle the analogies contextualists have claimed to hold between “know” and  
gradable adjectives, and (iii) is perfectly consistent with the idea of varyingly high epistemic 
standards.
Contextualism  in  epistemology  (henceforth  “contextualism”)  is  the  view  that  knowledge 
claims – paradigmatically statements of the form “S knows that p” or “S doesn't know that p”  
– are contextsensitive in the sense that they have different truth conditions across different 
contexts of use, depending on the epistemic standards obtaining within each context. As a 
result, “S knows that p” as uttered in a context with low standards does not express the same 
proposition as “S knows that p” as uttered in a context with high standards.1 Witness Keith 
DeRose: 
[T]he truth conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (…) 
vary in certain ways according to the context in which they are uttered. What so varies 
is  the epistemic  standards that  a  subject  must  meet  (or,  in  the case of  a  denial  of 
knowledge, fail to meet) in order for such a statement to be true. In some contexts, “S  
knows that P” requires for its truth that S have a true belief that P and also be in a very  
strong epistemic position with respect  to P,  while in  other contexts,  the very  same 
sentence may require for its truth, in addition to S’s having a true belief that P, only 
that S meet some lower epistemic standards. Thus, the contextualist will allow that one 
speaker  can  truthfully  say  “S  knows  that  P”,  while  another  speaker,  in  a  different 
context, where higher standards are in place, can truthfully say “S doesn’t know that P”,  
though both speakers are talking about the same S and the same P at the same time. 
(DeRose, 2000: 91)
Contextualists have often emphasized that these features of the semantics of “know” are not  
unique to the knowledge predicate. Rather, they can also be found in gradable adjectives: the 
truth conditions of “S is tall” vary across contexts with varying standards for tallness. As a 
result, “S is tall” can be true in one context and false in another. The analogy between “know” 
1There are versions of contextualism which do not involve a commitment to higher and lower standards. 
As Stanley himself points out, these views are immune to his objection.
and gradable adjectives has thus often served as an important motivation and illustration of  
contextualism.
Jason Stanley argues that this line of thought spells trouble for contextualism. Specifically, he 
argues that if the knowledge predicate were in fact contextsensitive in the postulated way then 
it should also be analogous to gradable adjectives when it comes to gradability; like “tall” and 
“flat”, it should exhibit the property of being gradable. Since it does not exhibit this property,  
contextualism fails. Let's have a closer look at the line of thought Stanley develops. He writes: 
According  to  [contextualists],  knowledge  ascriptions  come  in  varying  degrees  of 
strength. In other words, knowledge ascriptions are intuitively gradable. Contextualists 
speak (…) of higher and lower standards for knowledge. Comparative adjectives are one  
natural kind of gradable expressions. It is therefore no surprise that epistemologists 
(…) have been exploiting the analogy between “know” and adjectives such as “flat” and 
“tall”. But (...) the attempt to treat “know” as a gradable expression fails. First, it shows 
that one cannot appeal to the context-sensitivity of adjectives to justify the context-
dependence  of  knowledge  ascriptions.  Secondly,  it  casts doubt  upon the claim that 
knowledge comes in varying degrees of strength (…). (Stanley, 2005: 35f.)
In this passage, Stanley indicates that contextualists are somehow committed to the claim 
that  knowledge ascriptions are  gradable.  But  this  claim is  false,  according  to Stanley.  Its 
falsity  can  be  shown  by  applying  two  tests  for  gradability  to  the  case  of  the  knowledge 
predicate.  
First,  if  an  expression  is  gradable,  it  should  allow  for  modifiers.  For  example, 
predicative uses of gradable adjectives allow for modification, as in: 
(1) (a) That is very flat.
(b) That is really flat.
(…) Secondly, if an expression is gradable, it should be conceptually related to a natural 
comparative construction. So, for “flat” “tall”, and “small” we have “flatter than”, “taller 
than”, and “smaller than”.  (ibid.: 36)
Stanley then argues that “know” fails both of these tests; constructions such as “I don't really 
know it” (modification) or “I know it better” (comparative) and are not to be taken literally.  
Genuine modifier uses allow for constructions like “This is flat, but not really flat”. Genuine 
comparatives  allow  for  constructions  like  “I  am  tall,  but  you  are  taller”.  None  of  these 
constructions are available in the case of “know”: “I know it, but I don't really know it” and “I 
know it, but you know it better”  seem infelicitous.
On the basis of these findings, I think one should grant that “know” is indeed not gradable.  
Where Stanley goes astray is in thinking that this finding casts doubt upon contextualism as 
such. In fact, as I am going to show, neither the analogies that are said to obtain between 
gradable  adjectives  and  “know”  nor  the  idea  of  varying  epistemic  standards  commit 
contextualists to the gradability of “know” in any way.
What contextualists say is that in different contexts different standards for what counts as  
knowledge obtain. In some contexts they are high, in others they are low. That is, in some  
contexts, the epistemic position a subject must be in to count as knowing must be stronger  
than in others. As a consequence, the truth conditions of knowledge sentences vary. In these 
respects, “know” works just like gradable adjectives. 
But from this it does not follow that “know” itself  should be gradable.  For the very same  
analogies  contextualists  emphasize  between “know” and gradable  adjectives hold between 
“know” and clearly  non-gradable,  yet obviously  contextsensitive  expressions,  such as “tall 
enough” or “sufficiently flat”. 
All the crucial things the contextualist says about “know” can be said about these expressions 
as  well.  In  different  contexts,  different  standards  for  counting  as  sufficiently  flat  or  tall 
enough obtain. In some contexts they are high, in others they are low. If, for instance, one 
tries  to  decide whether  a  certain  lawn can be  used  for  a  boccia  game,  the  standards  for 
sufficient flatness are rather lax. If physicists try to decide whether a certain surface can be  
used for an experiment, the standards may be much higher. The same goes for “tall enough”. 
A rather high standard obtains in conversations about reaching the ceiling, and a rather low 
standard obtains in conversations about reaching the windowsill. That is, in different context,  
a  subject  must  have  different  heights  to  count  as  tall  enough  and  a  surface  must  have 
varyingly few bumps in order to count as sufficiently flat. Consequently, the truth conditions 
of “x is sufficiently flat” and “S is tall enough” vary across contexts. But neither “sufficiently  
flat” nor “tall enough” is gradable. 
If this is true, however, and the analogies contextualists have emphasized between “know” 
and gradable adjectives also hold for clearly non-gradable contextsensitive expressions like 
“tall enough” and “flat enough” then gradability does not seem to be a relevant feature in this  
analogy.  It  seems to be an independent  feature  of  some expressions,  which  are  in  other  
respects analogous to the predicate “know”. 
Why does Stanley think that contextualists are committed to the gradability of “know” in the 
first  place then? Looking for Stanley's  reasons is  instructive;  I  take it  that  underlying his  
gradability  objection  is  a  misled  understanding  of  contextualism  itself.  Invoking  certain 
remarks  by  Stewart  Cohen and  Keith  DeRose,  Stanley  tells  us  that  it  is  a  core  claim of 
contextualism that knowledge comes in varying degrees of strength. Since Stanley does not  
give us bibliographical references with respect to these remarks, it is  hard to see whether  
Cohen and DeRose have actually formulated their view in these words. If so, they have chosen  
a very misleading way of doing so. It is quite natural to expect a predicate to be gradable if we  
can truly state that the property it picks out comes in varying degrees of strength. If a core  
claim of contextualism really were that knowledge comes in varying degrees of strength it 
would therefore indeed be surprising if “know” were not gradable. 
Luckily,  contextualists  are  not  committed  to  what  Stanley  takes  to  be  their  core  claim. 
According  to  contextualists,  a  subject  has  to  meet  varyingly  high  standards  to  count  as 
knowing.  This is a metalinguistic claim about the application conditions of the knowledge 
predicate. These standards are gradable and so are the epistemic positions a subject must be 
in to meet these standards: both can be lined up along a scale in ascending order; we can line  
up standards from low to high and epistemic positions from weak to strong. In each case,  
both of Stanley's  tests for  gradability – modifier  use and comparative  construction – are 
satisfied: we can say that a standard is high, but not really high, or that someone is in a strong 
epistemic position, but not in a really strong epistemic position. Likewise, we can say that a 
given standard is higher than some other standard, or that someone is in a better epistemic 
position with respect to p than someone else. 
In spite of these gradable elements, however, it does not make any more sense to say that 
knowledge comes in varying degrees of strength than to say that being tall enough or being  
sufficiently  flat  come in degrees.  There is  a gradable element to these predicates  as well:  
relative to different standards, different heights count as tall and different degrees of flatness 
count as flat. We can arrange heights and degrees of flatness along a scale. And in a derived 
sense we can line up different instances of being tall enough or being sufficiently flat along a 
scale as well. We can say that the property of being tall enough is satisfied to a higher degree 
the taller the subject is. And we can say that the property of being sufficiently flat is satisfied  
to a higher degree the flatter the subject is.
In  the  same  derived sense  we  can  grade  knowledge  relations.  We can  say  that  they  are 
realized to a higher degree the stronger the required epistemic position is. But we should keep 
in mind that this is just a very loose formulation of what is really claimed. In speaking this 
way, we are not really grading “tall enough”, “sufficiently flat” or “know”. What we are grading 
are heights, degrees of flatness and epistemic positions, things that have to reach a certain 
degree for “tall enough”, “sufficiently flat”, or “know” to apply simpliciter. Strictly speaking, 
being tall enough and being sufficiently flat do not come in degrees. Neither does knowledge.  
We therefore should not expect “know” to pass Stanley’s tests for gradability.
The  upshot  thus  far  is  that  in  certain  respects,  “know”  functions  like  modified gradable 
adjectives  such as “tall  enough” or “sufficiently flat”  rather than functioning like gradable 
adjectives such as “tall” or “flat”.2 It is what I would like to call a pure threshold predicate: In 
each context, the obtaining standard fixes the conditions that have to be satisfied for a subject 
to exceed the threshold. Once the threshold is exceeded, the predicate applies. This is the only  
purpose  the  predicate  has.  It  marks  whether  the  threshold  is  surpassed  or  not.  So  the 
predicate is either satisfied simpliciter or not at all. It cannot be satisfied to certain degrees. 
Gradable  adjectives  are  more  complex.  They  are  threshold  predicates,  but  impure ones. 
Context  determines  the standard that has to be met for them to apply  simpliciter,  but in 
contrast to pure threshold predicates they can also be satisfied to certain degrees. That is why 
we can speak of one person being taller than another, thereby indicating that the first person  
satisfies  the  tallness  predicate  to  a  higher  degree  than  the  second  one.  Pure  threshold 
predicates do not admit of that: we cannot speak of one person being more tall enough or 
knowing something to a higher degree than another person.3
Stanley thinks that this line of thought is thoroughly mistaken and offers a brief argument 
against it in his book. In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that his objection is severely  
flawed in a variety of ways. Here is what he says:
One reaction (…) is to maintain that I have focused on the wrong model (…). Instead of  
“know” being analogous to “flat” or “tall”, the contextualist claim is rather that “know” 
is analogous to “flat  enough” or “tall  enough”. (…) It is not clear to me in what sense 
“know” is supposed to be analogous to “tall enough” (…) or even “justified enough”.  
There are all  sorts of  disanalogies (…). Most alarmingly, one standard use of  these 
expressions is to convey that something has the property for a sufficient degree for 
present purposes, though it does not in fact have the property. (Stanely 2005: 43)
In accordance to this standard use, Stanley argues,  we can felicitously say things like the 
following: 
(23) He isn't tall, but he's tall enough. (ibid.: 44)
(24) I may not be justified in my suspicion, but I'm justified enough to investigate further. 
(ibid.)
He then goes on to argue: 
If “know” is supposed to be synonymous with something like “is justified enough in 
one's true belief” then (…) one would expect to be able smoothly to say things like:
2
This point is also made by Halliday (2007).
3Halliday (2007: 390) makes a very similar distinction in terms of two senses of “gradability“. 
(25) John isn't justified in his belief that the bank is open, but he knows that the bank 
is open. (ibid.)
Since this is infelicitous, Stanley concludes that 
'know that p' simply doesn't behave as 'is justified enough in one's true belief that p'. 
These disanalogies are sufficient to undermine the plausibility of the proposal. (ibid.)
In this passage, Stanley makes a variety of very dubious moves, the most dubious of which is  
that  he distorts his opponent's proposal considerably in the course of the passage I have just 
quoted.  The  proposal  he  explicitly  considers  at  first  –  and  which  is  in  fact  what  I  (and  
Halliday 2007) have argued for – is that know is in many ways analogous to “tall enough”, 
“flat enough” or – for all I care – “justified enough”. This claim is then distorted to the claim 
that  “'know' is  synonymous with something like 'is  justified enough in one's  true belief'”, 
which is a very different claim. Synonymity requires substitutability. Analogies don't. That “is 
justified enough” cannot be substituted by “knows” in the exemplary sentences is therefore 
not decisive at all against the proposal at issue. 
The  important  question  is:  is  the  infelicity  of  (25)  problematic  for  the  actual  proposal,  
according to which there are important analogies between “know” and “tall enough”? Not as 
far as I can see. The claim that there are important, or even crucial, analogies between two 
things in  some respects can hardly be criticized on the basis of the finding that there are  
disanalogies between the two things in other respects. The proposal at issue is that gradability 
is not to be expected in the case of “know” because “know” - like “tall enough” - is a pure 
threshold predicate. This does not imply that there are no disanalogies between the terms. It 
is therefore strange that “[i]t is not clear to [Stanley] in what sense 'know' is supposed to be 
analogous  to  'tall  enough'”  solely  on  the  basis  of  the  fact  that  “[t]here  are  all  sorts  of  
disanalogies”.
Nevertheless, there is one very legitimate worry left to answer. I am not sure whether this 
worry is actually what guides Stanley's criticism, but I take it to be the most promising way to  
attack the view I have presented: the worry is that the disanalogies that can be observed 
between “know” on the one hand and “tall enough” and “sufficiently flat” on the other arise  
from the very property that I have postulated to be analogous between them. If that were the  
case – if what I have claimed to be analogous between “know” and “tall enough” indeed gave 
rise to a behaviour of “tall enough” that cannot also be observed in the case of “know” - then, 
of course, this would strongly count against the postulated analogy between them. As I will  
show, however, this is not the case. 
The property I have identified as analogous between “know” and “tall enough” is that both are 
pure threshold predicates. That means that the predicate either applies simpliciter or not at 
all,  and  whether  or  not  it  applies  depends  on whether  or  not  a  contextually  determined 
threshold for its application is surpassed or not. Hence, the question we need to turn to is 
whether  their being  pure  threshold  predicates gives  rise  to  the  fact  that  “tall  enough”, 
“sufficiently flat”, and “justified enough” can be combined with a denial of “tall”, “flat”, or  
“justified” - a denial, that is, of their underlying unmodified predicates? 
The answer is straightforward: there are lots of pure threshold predicates whose attribution  
cannot felicitously be combined with a denial of their underlying unmodified predicates. Just 
consider “very tall”. It clearly is a pure threshold predicate, but nevertheless it is infelicitous 
to say  “He's very  tall,  but he's  not  tall”.  The  same goes  for  “absolutely  flat”,  and “highly  
justified”. It also goes for covertly modified predicates such as “excellent” and “vanished”,  
which  I  take  to  be  roughly  equivalent  to  “extremely  good”  and  “completely  gone”, 
respectively.  In  all  of  these  cases,  the  context  determines  a  threshold  above  which  the 
predicates apply. None of them is gradable, and none of them can be felicitously combined 
with a denial of their underlying unmodified predicates. If something is absolutely flat, it is 
also flat. If something is highly justified, it is also justified. If something is excellent, it is also  
good. If something is vanished, it is also gone.
Now, if the scale on which “know” marks a certain threshold is a scale of better or worse  
epistemic statuses – or of higher or lower justification – but “know” requires an excellent,  
very good, absolute, extremely good or simply a high level of justification, then it is not to be 
expected that “know” can occur in statements such as “He knows, but he's not justified”. The 
threshold  for  “know”  can  never  be  lower  than  the  threshold  for  “justified”,  just  as  the 
threshold for “very tall” can never be lower than the threshold for “tall”. In this respect, pure 
threshold predicates can differ: the threshold for “tall enough” can be – and often is – lower  
than the threshold for “tall”, as the felicity of Stanley's statement (23) shows. But this is not a  
consequence of “tall enough” being a pure threshold predicate. Rather, it is once more an 
independent  feature  of  some pure  threshold  predicates.  I  therefore  conclude  that  the 
disanalogy Stanley observes between “know” and “tall enough” does not arise from the feature 
that I have identified as analogous between the two. As a consequence, the disanalogy does 
not cast doubt upon the claim that they have this feature in common. 
What my discussion has shown is this: Stanley is right. “Know” is not gradable, whereas some 
contextsensitive adjectives such as “tall” are. But none of the consequences Stanley draws 
from this finding follow from it. First, and most importantly, it does not follow that “know” is  
not  a  context-sensitive  term.  As I  have shown,  the contextualist  is  not  committed  to the 
gradability of “know” in the first place. Secondly, Stanley’s finding that “know” is not gradable 
does not threaten the analogy between “know” and gradable adjectives. It shows that they are 
not analogous with respect to gradability, all right. But this is perfectly compatible with the 
line of thought typically endorsed by contextualists. The analogy they stress is the sensitivity  
to standards which obtains in both cases. And this sensitivity to standards has nothing to do 
with gradability,  as  clearly non-gradable  but nonetheless standard-sensitive  expressions – 
pure threshold predicates such as “tall enough”, “very flat”, “highly justified”, and “excellent” 
-  show.  Third,  and  finally,  Stanley’s  finding  does  not  cast  doubt  upon  a  core  claim  of 
contextualism. It might cast doubt upon the claim that knowledge comes in degrees. But this  
claim is not more than a distortion of an essential thesis of contextualism. It is a loose and 
misleading  formulation  of  the  claim that  what  is  required  for“know” to  apply comes  in 
degrees. This is what contextualists are committed to. But as other cases of pure threshold 
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